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Much of the current research on the internet that focuses on security and trust issues 
proposes that we can construct technological and legal solutions to increase trust and 
improve the user experience in online environments. We argue in this paper that 
these discussions and the solutions proposed may have serious implications for our 
online experiences, for user rights and indeed for user driven innovation. Further, 
they tend to ignore a whole range of user practices which threaten to undermine our 
trust and use of the internet more than hackers, cheaters, lurkers, spam and illegal 
content (Nissenbaum, 2001). Such practices include the behaviour of commercial 
operators who routinely and implicitly datamine their users for commercial 
purposes, track user behaviour for copyright and IP infringements, filter out 
'dangerous' information or, in the case of some public sector bodies, 'misplace' whole 
databases of non-encrypted information on citizens. As Ireland becomes a post-
construction economy it is apparent that only certain user practices get socially 
constructed as 'harmful' and 'risky' in the knowledge society while others do not.  
 
In this paper we lay some theoretical foundations for examining governance, users 
and trust in online environments. Trust has been a central concern in the social 
sciences since, at least, the pioneering work of Georg Simmel's “The Philosophy of 
Money”, in which the author described trust as fundamental for the integration of 
the society. Later  sociologists – like Niklas Luhmann and Anthony Giddens -, have 
attended to the problem of trust, clearly relating the concept to the issue of “risk in 
modern societies”.  The goal of this paper is not to provide an exhaustive survey of 
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the sociological literature in this area but rather to begin to explore different 
disciplinary conceptions of trust. The PRTLI funded project from which this paper 
has emerged is an interdisciplinary team of mathematicians, computer scientists, 
engineers, designers and sociologists and it emerged early on that people had 
different understandings of the key challenges facing the internet, particularly as 
they related to security and trust.  Of particular concern to the authors is the extent to 
which we can delegate security maintenance and governance to technology, what 
decisions get coded into these solutions and what the implications might be for end 
users.  
 
This paper is then a first contribution to building bridges between different 
disciplines and a contribution to the project’s mapping of key social and economic 
issues surrounding the future development of the internet.  In this paper we compare 
different notions of trust: the sociological, the definition existing in automation and 
the definition of trust developed in early computer science (CS) literature. Our goal is 
to outline similarities and differences in these notions, as a starting point for a 
forthcoming review on the contemporary conception of trust in computer science. 
For this reason, at the end of the paper, we identify some interpretative concepts – in 
the light of the analysis provided in this manuscript - that we will use in our future 
work. We begin however by outlining the importance of trust as an issue in relation 
to the internet and the knowledge society in post-celtic tiger Ireland.  
 
 
2.THE INTERNET AND THE KNOWLEDGE  SOCIETY IN POST-CELTIC TIGER 
IRELAND. 
 
The Internet grew out of the libertarian counter culture of the 1960s and of course the 
military-academic research complex in the United States. It outgrew proprietary 
networks in the 1980s and 1990s in large part due to its openness, or what Zittrain 
calls its generativity, i.e. the fact that anyone can write an application to operate over 
the internet (Zittrain, 2008). It became, along with the personal computer, the 
defining technology of the information or knowledge society and increasingly a key 
driver in the growth of the American and subsequently the Irish ICT and software 
industries and economies in the 1990s. Metaphors like the ‘information 
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superhighway’, the ‘world wide web’ and ‘surfing’ were used to domesticate an 
otherwise rather unattractive technology of networks, switches and software 
programmes.   
 
It is over ten years since Ireland published a strategy and vision of its information 
society (ISSC, 1996). The strategy focussed on five key areas: awareness, 
infrastructure, learning, enterprise and government. In reality the focus was on 
developing a high speed telecommunications infrastructure which schools, 
companies, public institutions and individuals could ‘exploit’ to generate, share and 
access knowledge. Bill Melody noted a year later that the focus in this report was on 
the supply side, the networks and the hardware and software suppliers rather than 
on the demand side (Melody, 1997). Indeed Ireland’s development of a broadband 
information infrastructure has been slow during the period now referred to as the 
Celtic Tiger years and by 2008 just over thirty percent of households in Ireland had a 
broadband connection to the internet with two thirds of this growth occurring in 
2006/07. The EU27 average was 77 percent. Much of this growth has occurred in the 
Eastern part of the country and regional variations in access still exist (CSO, 2008 ). 
Meanwhile the political impetus behind the information society vision has 
dissipated. The annual surveys are no more and the Information Society Commission 
expired at the end of 20041. Before it disappeared the ISC itself was commissioning 
reports on the knowledge society and  while access and inclusion remained 
important issues, a new interest emerged and included data protection, unsolicited e-
mail, network security and recommended a study of cyber-crime in Ireland (ISC, 
2002). Building the network has clearly given way to concerns with what people are 
doing on that network.  
 
An initial examination of Irish newspapers found regular stories about computer and 
internet security and calls for more control over the use and handling of information 
(i.e. the demand for more Trust). For example, recently one of the biggest cyber-
frauds occurred, when a hacker was able to obtain the personal details of every 
single customer that has booked into one of Best Western's European hotels since 
                                                 
1  http://www.isc.ie/ 
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20072. It is estimated that the identities (including financial details) of 8 millions 
people have been stolen. On a more local level, issues related to computer security 
have recently affected government and public bodies,. For example, the banking 
details and Personal Public Service numbers of at least 2,000 employees from seven 
different public bodies which were stored on laptop computers were stolen in recent 
years3. The Comptroller Auditor General's (CAG) office, responsible for the stolen 
laptop has, hence, announced its intention to start a process for improving data 
security procedures4. Similar cases, of stolen laptop from public and governmental 
bodies, urge the Government to beef up its computer security systems5 . Another 
recent example is related to public website attacks. During May 2008 more than a 
hundred Irish websites fell victim to hacker attacks, including one for the Irish 
presidency of the EU6. Even if the Department of Foreign affairs confirmed that there 
was no loss of sensitive data from its website, it is clear that the delay in reporting 
such events to users and their frequency is likely to contribute to a demand for more 
computer security and reliable data protection solutions. Another consequence of 
this is that words like firewall, password, privacy, identity theft, malicious hackers, 
computer worms, cyber crime and so on, are widely becoming part of our common 
vocabulary. But it is not clear what these terms mean for citizens. 
 
 
Not all of the issues related to cybersecurity are related to hackers and poor security 
procedures. The recent case at the European Court of Human Rights taken by the 
                                                 
2  See 
http://www.sundayherald.com/news/heraldnews/display.var.2432225.0.0.
php 
3  See 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2008/0812/1218477342200.
html 
4  See CAG Press Release http://audgen.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=1106 
and 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2008/0802/1217368897558.
html 
5  See http://www.independent.ie/breaking-news/national-
news/politics/govt-urged-to-beef-up-computer-security-systems-
1285260.html 
6  See 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/2008/0606/1212677071145.
html 
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Irish Council for Civil Liberties and Rights Watch in the UK highlighted just how 
extensive and covert the data  surveillance and retention activities of governments 
can be.  This case found that the British Ministry of Defence was storing all 
telephone, fax, e-mail and data communications between the UK and Ireland for the 
past seven years. The court found that this infringed on people’s privacy under the 
European Convention of Human Rights7. Further, academic work points to the 
covert monitoring of user behaviour on commercial sites and dataveillance whereby 
personal profiles are matched to user behaviour online and used to target or 
personalize commercial services (Humphries, 2008, Jarrett, 1999, Jarrett, 2008). It is 
difficult at this stage to track how extensive such behaviour is but it is clear that 
internet based technologies and new applications like social networking sites are 
facilitating easy tracking, monitoring and targeting of users. Manuel Castells has 
argued that ‘The transformation of liberty and privacy on the Internet is a direct 
result of its commercialisation. The need to secure and identify communication on 
the Internet to make money out of it, and the need to protect intellectual property 
rights’ (Castells, 2001). This has lead to on the one hand, the increasing use of 
surveillance and monitoring technologies to track user behaviour and on the other to 
the development of a discourse of risk, security and threat. This trend has been 
compounded post 9/11 with the changing geo-political climate.  
 
 
At present moves to improve security of data and use by institutions and individuals 
of private information are largely voluntary and focus on improving user practice 
and raising awareness. Thus recently the Irish Computer Society (ICS) – as an answer 
to the need for more security - has launched the first forum focusing on data 
protection and privacy. The forum will offer seminars, workshops and online 
resources, and encourage computer specialists to become certified on the ICS Data 
Protection Practitioner course8. This will – according to ICS - help Ireland in 
improving its – at the moment very low - performance in the field of computer 
                                                 
7  
http://iccl.ie/DB_Data/news/CallsforsurveillancelawreformafterStrasbourgcourtvictory_80.htm 
8  See 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/2008/0530/1212048843820.
html and http://www.ics.ie/dp/ 
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security and privacy. In the same vein the Internet Advisory Board9 was launched by 
the Irish Ministry for Justice Equality and Law Reform to promote Internet 
awareness including that of security and protection. The office of the Data 
Commissioner is another body which highlights abuses of data and in some cases 
pursues the perpetrators to court. Much of the current policy in this area places the 
burden of security on the end user while corporations, public sector bodies, internet 
service providers and other operators largely operate under voluntary codes of 
conduct.  
 
The openness of the internet is increasingly seen as a weakness on the international 
stage. A consortium of regulatory, industrial and trade organisations are pushing for 
greater control and surveillance of users on the internet, perhaps even turning the 
internet into a black box, a locked down system to which only a few have the keys. 
The problem can be understood referring, to The Future of the Internet by Zittrain 
(2008). In this book the author praises what he calls the “generativity” of the Internet 
+ PC architecture (i.e. the openness of this infrastructure). According to Zittrain10, 
Generativity is “a system's capacity to produce unanticipated change through unfiltered 
contributions from broad and varied audiences “. However Zittrain notes that many of 
today’s major “internet players11” advocate a more closed approach. This could lead 
to a situation in which an “unthinkable level of enclosure is likely to be the rule from which 
we must negotiate and justify exceptions” (pg. 5). In this light, that of trust seems to be 
one of the key concepts of this process of enclosure and ‘Trusted Systems’, as 
currently envisaged by technologists are “systems that can be trusted as against the 
people who use them” (pg. 43). Hence, Zittrain argues, Trusted Systems are one of the 
ways thorough which the generativity of the internet is threatened by more 
lockdown: the more of this type of trust we have, the less the Internet+PC users will 
be able to produce innovative things. A similar argument is maintained by Lawrence 
Lessig (1999) where he points out that Trusted Systems will enforce the Digital 
Rights Management at a level in which technology will grant the owner of copyright 
more control over content than the one prescribed by the law.  
                                                 
9  See http://www.iab.ie 
10  Jonathan Zittrain Interview 
http://www.blauexchange.org/int_jzittrain.html 
11 Among these players Zittrain (2005, pg. 41-42) quotes regulators, the technology industry 
and mainstream consumers/users. 
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Thus it is clear that there are a range of actors currently concerned with negotiating a 
range of approaches to developing, maintaining and increasing Trust and Trusted 
Systems on the internet.  Understanding the problem of Trust and Trusted Systems 
seems to us an interesting and challenging sociological problem, especially from a 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) point of view. We argue that current 
conceptions of trust should include insights from sociology, and not be confined to 
the knowledge domain of computer security experts, lawyers or mastered 
exclusively by global IT corporations. We should instead make an attempt to 
understand this notion using sociological concepts. In fact, it is important that these 
issues are judged and studied not only from the technical point of view but also from 
the sociological one: assuming a techno-centric vision there is always the risk to miss 
crucial attributes and actors in the knowledge society (Akrich and Miller, 2006). 
 
 
3. A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO TRUST 
 
In order to understand the conceptualisation of trust in the computer science 
domain, we must first understand how sociologists approach the concept. This is 
because we aim to outline the existence of differences and similarities between the 
two ”types” of trust. It must be stated, however, that we do not aim to provide a 
broad review of sociological trust literature, for which the reader is directed to work 
by McKnight and Chervany (1996). More modestly our intention is to sketch some 
interesting issues. For this reason we take into account a restricted but significant set 
of contributions. 
 
Trust is usually seen by sociologists as a three part relationship: “A trusts B to do, or 
with respect to X” (Hardin, 2006, pg. 19). In this definition we have the trustor (A) – 
the actor who is willing to act, placing confidence, reliability or its own vulnerability, 
in the hands of others -, the trustee (B) – the actor in which trust is placed, who can 
fulfill his/her role as well as betray the trustor -, and the object or result toward 
which trust is directed (X). For example, ”I trust (trustor) the baby-sitter (trustee) to keep 
safe my child (the object of trust)” or “we (trustor) trust the government (trustee) to fulfill its 
electoral promises (the object of trust)” or “the mother (trustor) trust her daughter (trustee) 
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not to return late on night”.  Of course not all trust relationships are considered equal. 
Referring to the three examples above Sztompka distinguishes between 
“responsive12”, “anticipatory13” and “evocative14” trust. There is no need to enter in 
the problem of the various forms of trust, but for our goal it is important to keep in 
mind the three part relationship of trust, with particular emphasis on the relation 
between the trustor and the trustee. This tells us that a trust relation involves 
somehow a mutual commitment (Deutsch, 1958; Sztompka, 1999; Jalava, 2003) – a close 
inter-relation – between the trustor and the trustee. 
 
It is worth noting that many major sociologists have addressed the issue of trust. 
Historically, Simmel was probably one of the first to take trust into account when, in 
The Philosophy of Money (1978), he saw trust as one of the basic element for 
economic/monetary transactions and ultimately for the integration of society. 
However, the main contributions to the problem are probably the works by Niklas 
Luhman Trust and Power (1979) and Familiarity, Confidence, Trust (1988), the latter a 
chapter contained in the often quoted book Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative 
Relations by Gambetta (1988b).  
 
Luhmann defined trust as “an attitude which allows for risk-taking decisions” (Luhmann, 
1988, pg. 103) or “as a gamble, a risky investment” (Luhmann, 1980, pg. 24). Trust, then, 
has been directly linked by Luhmann in a circular relation with risk, considered as 
both external and internal to actions. Risk “represents a re-entry of the difference between 
controllable and uncontrollable into the controllable” (1988, pg. 100). Therefore, according 
to Luhmann, trust is directly related with the subjective ability to assume risk-taking 
decisions. As such trust helps also in the reduction of complexity in the presence of 
several alternatives of action. On this basis Luhmann distinguished between trust 
and confidence, the latter seen as a situation in which “If you do not consider 
alternatives […] you are in a situation of confidence” (pg. 97-98). Another major 
Luhmannian distinction is between trust and rational calculation, the former related 
                                                 
12  Responsive trust “involve the act of entrusting some valuable object to somebody 
else, with his or her consent” (Sztompka, 1999, pg. 25) 
13  Anticipatory trust is when “I act toward others because I believe that the actions 
which they carry out anyway will be favorable to my interests, needs and expectations” 
(Sztompka, 1999, pg. 25) 
14  Evocative trust is when “we act on the belief that the other person will reciprocate 
with trust toward ourselves” (Sztompka, 1999, pg. 25) 
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to an action’s result that could lead to a damage greater than the possible advantages 
(Deutsch, 1958), whereas instead in rational calculation the relations between 
advantage and damage are always in favour of the advantages.  
 
For several reasons the work by Luhmann seems to be the basis for understanding 
the sociological notion of trust. Many other authors have adopted a perspective on 
trust very close to that of Luhmann or at least using the concepts, outlined by him, in 
a similar fashion.  For example Lewis and Weigert (1985) and Moellering (2001) saw 
trust as a functional alternative to rational prediction for the reduction of complexity. 
Giddens (1990) too seemed to adopt a Luhmanian perspective, linking trust with 
risk. However, Giddens also partly criticized Luhmann in relation to the role of 
institutionalized risk as part of the Risk Society15 notion (Beck, Giddens and Lash, 
1994) and also in relation to a weaker separation between confidence and trust. 
McAllister (1995) in his inquiry on the interpersonal trust saw trust as enablers for 
people to take risks.  
 
Trust has been related to the notion of social capital (Putnam, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995), 
whereas trust seems to have a functional16 role in supporting cooperative relations in 
communities or among people (Gambetta, 1998b; Axelrod, 1981). Vulnerability has 
also often been portrayed as one of the main features of trust (Baier, 1986; Mayer et 
al, 1995), and considered as the situation where the trustor depends on the trustee 
good will, hence the trustor is vulnerable to the limits of that good will. Reduction of 
uncertainty for action has also been related to trust (Coleman, 1990; Gambetta, 1998a; 
Sztompka, 1999). Barber (1983) and Gambetta (1988) linked trust with expectations 
that people have of each other and to the possibility to a betrayal in such 
expectations. Another major issue is that of reputation (Dasgupta, 1988; Good, 1988), 
which emerged in particular in relation to risky economic transactions and described 
as a fundamental pre-condition for placing trust.  Also weak knowledge or “quasi-
faith” has been related to trust (Simmel, 1978; Giddens, 1991; Moellering, 2001), 
meaning that we trust basing our judgment on unknowable situations or on 
“technical principles” we ignore. 
                                                 
15  Society increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety), which 
generates the notion of risk. 
16  According to Luhmann (1988, pg. 95) his main goal was to address the problem of 
the “function of trust” in the social system. 
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3.2 Humans don’t trust machines 
 
Even if the concept of trust has, as we saw above, many “features”, there is one 
which has attracted our attention: the trust relationships between human/social and 
natural/technological actors. This feature of trust is well described in the work by 
Sztompka (1999) : 
“Intuitively we feel that trust must be vested in people, rather than natural objects or 
event. Even if we seemingly confer trust on objects, such as saying “I trust Japanese cars” 
or “I trust Swiss watches,” or “ I trust French Rapid trains”, we in fact refer to humanly 
created systems and indirectly we trust the designers, producers, and operators whose 
ingenuity and labor are somehow encrypted in the objects.” (pg. 19-20) 
“Trust is not the orientation we would take toward the natural world. It does not sound 
proper to say “I trust the rain to fall,” or “I trust these flowers to grow,” but it is quite 
normal to say “I trust the meteorologists to predict the rain,” or “ I trust the gardener to 
tend for  flowers well,”. Trust belongs to human and not to natural discourse.” (pg. 21) 
 
Trust seems then, according to Sztompka, to be exclusively a human affair: it does 
not belong at all to natural discourse. Trust cannot be conferred at all to natural 
object such as the sun or the rain. Even when it seems to be quite acceptable to confer 
trust to things, like the car or the train, according to Sztompka we are conferring trust 
not to things themselves but to the designer, operators, producers and finally toward 
the institutionalized systems of knowledge encrypted into those things. We can’t 
place trust in things or natural objects because – according to Sztompka - this doesn’t 
help us in making the social world controllable or less uncertain. 
 
It is interesting to note that the argument by Sztompka echoes the well known 
contribution by Giddens (1990). Giddens argues that lay people trust expert systems 
“of technical accomplishment or professional expertise that organize large areas of the 
material and social environment in which we live today” (pg. 27).  According to Giddens it 
is a condition of what he called Reflexive Modernity for lay persons (trustor) to 
confer trust, based on “faith” and “weak knowledge”, to expert systems (trustee). 
However the trust relation in this case is mediated by what Giddens call the access 
point “Although everyone is aware that the real repository of trust is in the abstract system, 
rather than in the individuals who in specific contexts “represent” it, access points carry a 
reminder that it is flesh-and-blood people (who are potentially fallible) who are its operators.”.  
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This is clear for example in the case of air-travel, where lay people place their trust in 
the air crew personnel, more than on the air security statistics. Therefore we see that 
the access point17– interfaces between lay persons and systems of expert and 
expertise – remind us that technological systems, according to Giddens, are in fact 
human actions (even if actions are disembedded and distanciated in time and space). 
Even for Giddens then, who truly touches the point of lay persons’ trust in 
technological systems, trust seems to be only a human affair.  
 
Summarizing, we can conclude that one of the main features of trust, according to 
sociologists, is that this is a human property only. Both the trustor and the trustee of 
the three part relations of trust are in the end human18 actors.   
 
 
Figure 1 – Trust relation according to sociologists 
 
 
4. TRUST IN THE MACHINE 
Before entering into the CS domain we have to account for another way of 
conceiving trust:  the trust relations between humans and machines in the field of 
automation19. It is interesting to note that the sociological relation between the trustor 
and the trustee is somehow radically modified if we look at this domain (e.g. Zuboff, 
1988; Miur, 1994; Lee and Moray, 1991; Moray and Inagaki, 1999; Madsen and 
                                                 
17  That are considered form of faceless commitment. 
18  Whether in the form of individual (e.g. McAllister, 1995; Sztompka, 1999), collective 
(e.g. Hagen and Cohe, 1998) or institutional (e.g. Shapiro, 1987; Farrel and Knight, 2003) 
actors. 
19  Automation: is the use of control systems such as computers to control industrial 
machinery and processes, reducing the need for human intervention. From Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automation 
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Gregor, 2000; Lee and See, 2004). For example Moray and Inagaki (1999) defined 
trust as follows: 
 
“We use the term to refer to an attitude of mind towards an agent with whom a human 
operator is collaborating. The agent may be another human or a machine (automated 
sensor, automated controller, computer hardware, software programs or software 
’agents’, etc.). “ (pg. 204)  
 
From the above definition we see that the relation expressed by Sztompka - where 
when we say that we “trust the car to run” we trust its designer and not the car in 
itself -, is somehow modified. The trustee, according to Moray and Inagaki, may be a 
human as well as a machine, in various shapes or form. The operators using 
automation machinery and decision aid systems, in fact, seem to confer their trust in 
the machines, trusting them to perform the production tasks properly. It is not 
surprising then that also computers have gained the trust of humans. In human-
computer interaction for example, the human-computer trust relation is defined by 
Madsen and Gregor (2000) as “the extent to which a user is confident in, and willing to act 
on the basis of, the recommendations, actions, and decisions of an artificially intelligent 
decision aid.”. An example of the trust placed by humans in machines is: “the pilot 
(trustor) trust the auto-pilot system (trustee) to drive the aircraft”.  
 
The issue of trust in automation recall somehow the idea behind the book The Media 
Equation by Reeves and Naas (1996), in which the authors described how people treat 
various media (such as computers) exactly as they would real people.  Lee and See 
(2004) however warn us that there are important differences between human-human 
and human-automation trust, such as the lack of intentionality of machines and also 
the existence of an asymmetry between the human operator (the one who has the 
ultimate responsibility for the task, especially in production processes) and the 
machine who performs the task. 
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Figure 2 – Trust relation in automation and HCI 
What it is important for our discussion is, anyway, to consider the three part 
relationship of trust. The relationship described by Sztompka is clearly modified in 
automation (see Figure 1 Vs 2), because the trustee can clearly be a machine, while 
the trustor still remains a human actor: it is the operator or the user who place 
his/her trust in the machine and not vice versa. In conclusion while the actors in the 
sociological accounts don’t trust the machines (but trust the designers of the 
machines), the human actors in automation accounts – operators, users - seem 
instead to establish a concrete trust (or distrust) relationships with machines.  
However trust still remain clearly a human affair. 
 
 
5. THE MACHINES WHO TRUST 
The scenario of trust changes radically if we look at the CS domain. It is rather 
difficult to trace the origin of the notion of trust in CS, however we do not fail in 
saying that this issue emerged during the ’70s in an age where computer security 
started to become a fundamental issue (Myers, 1980), in particular inside the military 
environment of the USA. In this context computer security has been defined as “The 
protection resulting from all measures to deny unauthorized access and exploitation of 
friendly computer systems”20. 
 
One of the first to use the term Trusted Computer System was probably Nibaldi (1979). 
For him “Trusted computer systems are operating systems capable of preventing users from 
accessing more information than that to which they are authorized” (pg. 1). This prevention 
of access was based on the access control and related security policies within an 
                                                 
20  US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Words 
http://www.answers.com/library/Military%20Dictionary 
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Operating System. The most important contribution to the problem however was 
probably the so-called DoD Orange Book (NCSC, 1987) which provided a series of 
criteria as standards and metrics to evaluate “the degree of trust that can be placed in 
computer systems”. The Orange Book coupled the definition of a Trusted System  with 
that of Trusted Computing Base considered as “The totality of protection mechanisms 
within a computer system -- including hardware, firmware, and software -- the combination 
of which is  responsible for enforcing a security policy”.  Some of the concepts of this 
definition will become clear later on, for the moment we would like to focus on the 
“origin” of the idea of trusted systems and describe some key concepts.  
 
The first, often quoted, seminal work in this domain is the Anderson Report (1972) 
which formalized computer security as related to control: “Explicit control must be 
established over each user’s (programs) access to any system resource which is shared with 
any other user or (system) program”. The Anderson Report introduced the notion of 
Reference Monitor – a software module of Operating Systems which has the role of 
controlling the access to data and devices – and the notions of mandatory and 
discretionary security policy. Before we define what is a security policy we have to 
refer to another major contribution in the domain of Computer Security that of Bell 
and Lapadula (1976) which defined the major goal and main actors of Trusted 
Computer Systems: ”The essential problem is to control access of active entities to a set of 
passive (that is, protected) entities, based on some security policy. Active entities are called 
subjects […]; passive entities are called objects.“ (pg. 9). In the computer security 
language a subject, within an Operating System, is considered as “An active entity, 
generally in the form of a person, process21, or device that causes information to flow among 
objects or changes the system state.” (NCSC, Aqua Book, 1988). Whereas an object is “A 
passive entity that contains or receives information” (Aqua Book, 1988) such as certain 
I/O devices, data files, directories, memory segments and so on. 
 
Basically the problem of a Trusted Computer Systems is that to control how a subject 
access an object. According to Lee (1999, pg. 2) “The purpose of access controls is to 
authorise legitimate access by subjects to objects, and to prohibit illegitimate accesses. The 
essential notion is that without a legitimate access to an object, the system prohibits anything 
from happening with or to it. It can not be owned, created, destroyed, observed, altered, 
                                                 
21  A Process is the execution of a computer program by a system. 
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appended to, distributed, executed, or searched. “. What distinguishes whether or not a 
subject may access the object are the security policies. That of security policy is a key 
concept of trusted system and it is defined as “a statement of intent with regard to 
control over access to, dissemination of, and modification of information “ (From NCSC, 
Neon Orange Book22, Glossary, 1987). Basically a security policy is a statement 
(properly implemented within the computer system) which says how subjects (in 
which context, at what time, for what purpose, and according to what laws, 
standards, organizational rules and so on) can access a certain piece of information. 
The access is referred to a set of actions that can be performed, such as for example 
read, write or delete a piece of information. Certain policies are then considered 
related to a mandatory access control: “A means of restricting access to objects based on 
the sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the information contained in the objects and the 
formal authorization (i.e., clearance) of subjects to access information of such sensitivity.” 
(from NCSC Aqua Book, 1988). Translated in a more accessible language this type of 
access control is often related to sensitive data (e.g., government classified 
information or sensitive corporate data). Systems providing mandatory access 
controls must assign sensitivity labels to subjects and objects in the system. The labels 
represent the level of trust: the trust that the systems place to a subject and the level 
of trust that a subject must have to be able to access the object. In summary, 
mandatory access controls use sensitivity labels ranging from the most to the least 
sensitive (in the case of object for example from  "Top Secret", down to 
"Unclassified") to determine who can access what information in the system (Russell 
and Gangemi, 1991).   
 
Access control can also be discretionary: “A means of restricting access to objects based 
on the identity and need-to-know of the user, process and/or groups to which they belong.  
The controls are discretionary in the sense that a subject with a certain access permission is 
capable of passing that permission (perhaps indirectly) on to any other subject.  “(from Aqua 
Book, 1988). Let’s imagine that a subject A belongs to the research group X, then we 
can imagine that A is entitled to access all the information related to the research 
projects (the object) of the group X. In other words discretionary access control is 
                                                 
22  See this link where all the DoD books (so called Rainbow Series) are quoted 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rainbow_Series 
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based on access policies that restrict access to objects based on the identity of subjects 
and/or the groups to which they belong (Russell and Gangemi, 1991).   
 
One further point that we need to outline are the threats against which the security 
Trusted Systems here were built. In the Aqua Book  (NCSC, 1988)- a  DoD Glossary 
of Trusted Systems terms – there are several entries that describe different kinds of 
threats and the action these threats may conduct against the system. Of course given 
that the Trusted System developed within a military context the protection of the 
system from attacks (think for example about foreign countries attacks) as well as the 
protection of sensitive information were considered fundamental. According to the 
glossary a threat may be defined as “Any circumstance or event with the potential to 
cause harm to a system in the form of destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or 
denial of service.”. It is interesting to note that in this domain the concept of risk is 
taken into account in relation to threats. Risk is defined as “The probability that a 
particular threat will exploit a particular vulnerability of the system.”. These threats could 
have been related for example to the existence of back doors, logic bombs or Trojan 
horses in the code of the system as well as the inclusion of malicious hardware and 
firmware. All these threats were defined as “malicious logic”. Among the possible 
dangerous actions that could be perpetrated against the system the Aqua Book 
defined the penetration, the compromise, the tampering and the spoofing. Finally it 
is interesting to observe that the system security could have been circumvented also 
by the mean of exploiting design “errors” such as a security flaw “An error of 
commission or omission in a system that may allow protection mechanisms to be bypassed. “. 
 
 
6. DISCUSSION  
Entering the technical domain of trust we encounter several issues that the human-
centred approaches to trust, both in sociology and automation, are not able to 
address. It is clear that in a situation  described above it is the Trusted System that 
places its trust (and so it is the trustor) toward the subject (the trustee – which may be 
a human user as well as a process or a device) in relation to the access of information 
(the object of trust). The role of a Trusted System is indeed that of conferring trust to 
subjects, meanwhile “keeping an eye” on what they do, hence preventing 
unauthorized accesses to information. Early work in CS clearly outlines a very 
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different approach to trust, if compared with the sociological (as well as the 
automation) view of trust. A Trusted Computer Systems is a machine (trustor) who is 
entitled to trust several other entities (so called subject – the trustee) which are both 
human and non-human. If the trustor is a machine and the trustee might be in turn a 
human and a non-human, aren’t we radically approaching a different domain of 
trust? 
 
 
Figure 3 – Trusted Systems: machines who trust 
 
 
 
In further developing this literature review we will review  contemporary concepts 
of trust in computer science . In our opinion what we will need – for sociologically 
approaching it - are concepts that will allow us to break the common assumed 
division between the social and the technical worlds.  
 
At first, it is worth noticing that, many useful concepts have already been developed 
and used to understand the work of engineers and scientists (for example Bloor, 
1976; Bijker, 1995; Latour, 1987). In our opinion two concepts, drawn from the 
approach known as Actor-Network Theory (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987), seem to be 
useful for dealing with the CS trust notion:  free association (Callon, 1986) and  
delegation to non-humans (Latour, 1992).   
 
According to Callon (1986) one of the concepts which helps in the study of the role 
played by science and technology in structuring power relationships, is that of free 
associations. The basic idea behind this concept is that: 
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“The observer must abandon all a priori distinctions between natural and social events. 
[…]. Instead of imposing a pre-established grid of analysis upon these, the observer 
follows the actors in order to identify the manner in which these define and associate the 
different elements by which they build and explain their world, whether it be social or 
natural” (pg. 200-201) 
 
The concept of  free association captures how computer scientists use the word trust, 
in its various facets, to refer to both human and non-human actors. According to 
Latour (2005) the basic idea behind the free association concept is that it is not the 
duty of the sociologists to decide in advance what the social world is made of, 
because people as well as machines (human and non-human actors) may be part of 
this world (Latour, 1993).  
 
A second concept we found useful for our purposes is that of delegation to non-
humans. Latour (1992) described this concept in a didactic example of how to 
convince people to close the door behind them. The argument by Latour is that 
artefacts are at once strongly social and highly moral. In order to convince people to 
close the door there are two solutions: 
 
“either to discipline the people or to substitute for the unreliable people another delegated 
human character whose only function is to open and close the door. “. 
 
However paying a human porter for his/her unskilled work is quite an expensive 
solution and here is where engineers came into play with their arte-fact moral and 
political solution: 
 
“It is at this point that you have a relatively new choice: either to discipline the people or 
to substitute for the unreliable humans a delegated non-human character whose only 
function is to open and close the door. This is called a door-closer or a groom ('Groom' is a 
French trademark which is now part of the language).”. 
 
According to Latour, the ability to perform the task of closing the door has been 
delegated by engineers to a non-human character, which is able to perform the job of 
closing the door: the door-closer. This non-human character is very social and moral 
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because according to Latour “We have been able to delegate to non-humans not only force 
but also values, duties and ethics..”.  
 
What it is interesting in the concept of delegation – or moral prescription23 - to non-
human as related to trust in CS is that the act of deciding who is to be trusted or not, 
is no longer in the hand of the “human character”. Computer scientists have, since 
the early ‘70s, delegated to Trusted Systems the moral ability to decide who has to be 
trusted and who has not, and for what reasons (the moral prescription) (see for 
example NCSC, 1983). But the interest in the concept of delegation goes on as long as 
Latour noticed that “How can these prescriptions be brought out? By replacing them by 
strings of sentences (usually in the imperative) that are uttered (silently and continuously) by 
the mechanisms for the benefit of those who are mechanized: do this, do that, behave this way, 
don't go that way. Such sentences look very much like a programming language.”. The 
image portrayed here by Latour is that mechanisms and in general technological 
artifacts impose their moral prescription in a disciplined way: they never fail to tell 
people to behave in certain ways. It is easier to discipline a non-human which silently 
will pursue the task delegated to it by its designers, rather than convince all users to 
pursue a certain behavior.  Hence, the problem we will need to address in future 
work will be to understand what is meant by saying that computer systems have 
been delegated the ability to trust.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Discourses around access and inclusion in the information or knowledge society 
have given way to discourses around security, trust and governance. Much 
sociological work has seen trust as a human attitude which is placed in another 
human being in the form of a relationship. However computer science work makes 
no such distinction and suggests that we can equally trust human or non-human 
                                                 
23  Prescription is the moral and ethical dimension of mechanisms. 
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actors.  In ‘Trusted Computing’ the system is designed to control and manage access 
and authorization to information and knowledge.  Concepts like free association and 
delegation from Science and Technology Studies will we believe be useful in 
bridging the interdisciplinary gaps between members of our research team and can 
be deployed empirically to study the design, negotiation and contestation of these 
types of systems by groups of users.  
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